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CUSTODIAL PARENT DEPENDENCY
EXEMPTIONS: HUGHES V. HUGHES
In 1984, Congress amended Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) Section 152(e)1
to create an unambiguous presumption in favor of the custodial parent receiving
the dependency exemption(s). The language of Code Section 152(e) expressly pro-
vides that the custodial parent may release his/her presumptive right to the non-
custodial parent if the custodial parent signs a written declaration to that effect 3
On its face, however, Section 152(e) does not provide a state domestic relations
court with the power to order the custodial parent to execute the release. Yet, it
is this very power which the domestic relations courts of several states, including
Ohio, are exercising on a daily basis? Was this the intent of Congress when it
amended the federal law? The state courts are at polar ends of the spectrum on
this question.s Adding to this confusion, is the fact that the United States Supreme
Court has not yet addressed the issue.
In Hughes v. Hughes,5 the Ohio Supreme Court held that Sectiow 152(e), as
amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1984, did not prohibit a state domestic rela-
tions court from awarding federal dependency exemption(s) to the noncustodial
parent. Moreover, the majority found that the lower court's action did not infringe
on congressional power to lay and collect taxes on income.6 The Ohio Supreme
Court based its decision upon an analysis of Section 152(e) and its regulations,
the legislative history behind the amendment and stated concerns of the Internal
Revenue Service.
SECTION 152(E)
Prior to the 1984 amendments, Sections 151 and 152(e) provided that a
divorced or separated custodial parent was entitled to the dependency exemption.!
However, two exceptions were recognized. First, a noncustodial parent could
claim the exemption if the divorce decree or separation agreement so specified,
and that parent contributed at least $600 toward the support of the dependent dur-
ing the year? This pre-amendment statute clearly acknowledged the jurisdiction
of state courts to award the exemption to the noncustodial parent. Second, a non-
I Tax Reform Act of 1984, 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(1) (1984). These provisions became effective January 1, 1985.
226 U.S.C. § 152(e)(2) (1986).
3 See, infra notes 33-34, 43-47, 51-65.
4 1d.
535 Ohio St. 3d 165, 518 N.E.2d 1213 (1988).
61d. at 168.
71d. at 166-168.
8 I.R.C. §§ 151, 152(e) (1982); See, e.g., McGuire v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 765 (1981).
9 1.R.C. § 152(e)(2)(A)(i)(ii) (1982). See, Grider v. Grider, 376 SO.2d 1103 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979); Greeler
v. Greeler, 368 NW2d 2 (Minn. App. 1985); Hiland v. Hiland, 467 NE2d 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984); Hoyle
v. Hoyle, 473 NE2d 653 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Kolb v. Kolb, 479 SW2d 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); MacDonald
v. MacDonald, 122 H.D. 339, 443 A2d 1017 (1982); Morphew v. Morphew, 419 NE2d 770 (Ind. Ct. appr. 1981);
Niederkorn v. Niederkorn, 616 SW2d 529 (Mo. App. 1981); Pettitt v. Pettitt, 261 S02d 687 (La. App. 2d Cir
1972); Roberts v. Roberts, 553 SW2d 305 (Mo. App. 1977); Ruiz v. Ruiz, 668 SW2d 866 (Tex. App. 1984).
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custodial parent was entitled to the exemption if he/she provided $1200 or more
per child per year, and the custodial parent could not establish that he/she pro-
vided more for the support of the child.'0
Amended Section 152(e), as did its predecessor, provides a two-prong test."
If a child receives over half his support during the year from his divorced or
separated parents, and the child is in the custody of one or both parents for more
than half the year, then the child is deemed to be the dependent of the custodial
parent. 2 In this context, the term custodial parent is defined as the parent hav-
ing custody for a greater portion of the year. 3 This presumption in favor of the
custodial parent, however, is rebuttable.
Section 152(e) affords three exceptions to the general rule.14 First and fore-
most, the noncustodial parent will be deemed to have provided over one-half the
child's support for the year if the custodial parent releases his/her claim to the
exemption.' 5 A release is accomplished in two steps. The custodial parent must
sign a written declaration stating that he/she will not claim the child as a depen-
dent for that year.' 6 Second, the noncustodial parent must attach this declaration
to his/her federal income tax return. 17 (Form 8332, provided by the Internal
Revenue Service to accomplish this task, is found in Appendix A.)
The 1984 amendments to Section 152(e) were made primarily because the
Internal Revenue Service became involved in a multitude of disputes wherein each
parent claimed the exemption(s).' 8 The costs to the Government and the parties
to litigate these disputes was substantially higher than the amount of the exemp-
tion(s) and tax revenue at stake.'9 Congress believed that the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice would be less burdened if the law became more objective. 0 As a result, Con-
gress provided the custodial parent with the exemption(s) unless he/she expressly
waives that right.2'
'
0 I.R.C. § 152(e)(2)(B)(i)(ii) (1982).
111.R.C. § 152(e)(1)(A)(B) (1986).
12Id
.
13 1.R.C. § 152(e)(l)(B) (1986).
141.R.C. § 152(e)(2)(3)(4) (1986). Section 152(e)(3) provides an exception for multiple-support agreements.
Section 152(3)(4) provides an exception for certain pre-1985 instruments.-See, Struck v. Struck, 417 N.W.2d
382(S.D. 1987); Seip v. Seip, 725 S.W.2d 134 (Mo. App. 1987).
15 1.R.C. § 152(e)(2) (1986).
'
6 I.R.C. § 152(e)(2)(A) (1986).
'
1
.R.C. § 152(e)(2)(B) (1986). See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4T (1987).
"Hughes, supm at 166-167 citing Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 424, 427, Stat.
_ , 1498-1500 (1984) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 151, 152(e) (1984)).
19 d. at 1498-00.
201d. at 1498.
2126. U.S.C. § 152(e)(1) (1986).
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CUSTODIAL PARENT DEPENDENCY EXEMPTION
SURVEY: STATE COURT CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 152(E)
As written, Section 152(e) does not explicitly recognize the discretion of a
domestic relations court to award the dependency exemption to the noncustodial
parent.22 However, the language of Section 152(e)(2)(A) has been read to imply
authority upon a state trial court to order a custodial parent to execute an exemption
release3 The Minnesota Court of Appeals has recently undergone an unusual
metamorphosis in its legal analysis of the issue.24
In 1986, the Minnesota court held that the allocation of dependency exemp-
tions was still within the trial court's discretion under the amended statute.25
Hence, the court held that a custodial parent may be orderd to execute the neces-
sary waiver of exemption in favor of the noncustodial parent. 6 The court reasoned
that state court allocation of the exemption(s) does not interfere with Congres-
sional intent, nor does it affect the Internal Revenue Service.27 However, the court
noted that the custodial parent's execution of the waiver should be conditional upon
the receipt of support payments.28 Moreover, an indirect effect of such an award
will be an increase in income to which the child support guidelines apply. 9
In 1987, the Minnesota Court of Appeals distinguished this reasoning and
held that the dependency exemption for children could not be allocated by the trial
court0 The court held that federal law requires a custodial parent to intentionally
waive his/her claims to the exemption before it can be awarded to the noncustodial
parent.' In another case, the court held that a trial court is without authority to
award the exemptions to the parents for alternating years absent a clear waiver
by the custodial parent.3 2
In Arizona, a custodial parent may be ordered to execute the necessary waiver
of exemption in favor of a noncustodial parent who is paying child support.33 More-
22See 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)(2)(A)(B) (1986).
2 3See, supra note 3.
24See Valento v. Valento, 385 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Fudenberg v. Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1986); Gerady v. Gerady, 406 N.W. 2d. 10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); and Theroux v. Boehmler, 410
N.W.2d.354 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
25Fudenberg v. Molstad, 390 N.W.2d 19,21.
26 1d.
27Id.
28 1d.
29 /d.
30 Theroux v. Boehmler, 410 S.W.2d 354, 358 (Minn. Ct. APP. 1987). Fudenberg was not overruled. Rather,
in Theroux, the court held that the exemption may be awarded to the noncustodial parent when the trial court
deems "it necessary to involve its equitable powers to require a waiver to safeguard the economic well-being
of the family." Id.
31 Id.
32 Gerady v. Gerady, 406 N.W.2d 10,14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). However, § 1.152-4T of the regulations to section
152(e) provides that the release may apply "for a number of years (for example, alternate years)." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.152-4T (1987).
33Lincoln v. Lincoln, 746 P.2d 13, 17 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). 155 Ariz. 272.
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over, the Arizona Court of Appeals held it was an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to refuse to allocate the dependency exemption(s) . 4
The Texas Court of Appeals held that a noncustodial parent who sought an
order modifying a pre-1985 decree to provide him with the dependency exemp-
tions did not fall within one of the three exceptions to the general rule granting
the custodial parent the exemption(s).5 Hence, Texas strictly construed the amend-
ed sections.36
The Oregon Court of Appeals held that section 152 applies only to parents
who are or have been married.37 When parents have never been married, a trial
court lacks authority to designate which parent will receive the exemption based
on a prediction that the parent would provide over one-half of the child's support.38
Whether an unwed parent may claim the federal income tax exemption depends
upon the application of federal tax law to the actual facts.39
In Michigan, the Court of Appeals held that a trial court no longer has the
authority to determine which parent is entitled to the exemption 40 The court held
that the Internal Revenue Code clearly states that the custodial parent received
the exemption .4 ' However, in the future, if the custodial parent ever requests the
court for an increase in child support, the exemption will be a factor in that
decision42
On the other hand, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently held
that an order to the custodial parent to execute the required waiver of dependen-
cy was an integral part of awarding child support.43 (Emphasis added.) The court
noted that the new provision is entirely silent as to whether a trial court can re-
quire a custodial parent to execute a waiver.4 This silence demonstrates Congress's
indifference as to how the exemption is allocated, so long as the determination
is not left to the Internal Revenue Service 45 If Congress had intended to forbid
34 1d.
35Davis v. Fair, 707 S.W.2d 711, 715 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). The original divorce decree and prior modifica-
tion were silent as to who could claim the exemption. There was no multiple support agreement between the
parties. Lastly, the custodial parent had not signed a written declaration waiving her right to the exemptions.
Id.
36 See, infra notes 66-68. The dissent in Hughes cited Davis as a proper interpretation of the amendments to
section 152. Hughes, 35 Ohio St. 3d at 170 n.2.
37 Gleason v. Michlitsch, 728 P.2d 965, 967 (Or. Ct. App. 1986). 82 OR App 688 citing Dillard v. Commis-
sioner, 47 T.C. Memo.919 n.3 (1984).
38 Gleason at 967.
39 1d., citing Davis V Fair, 707 S.W.2d 711.
40Strickradt v. Strickradt, 401 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) 156 Mich App. 141.
4'id
42Id
.
43 Cross v. Crss, 363, S.E.2d 449, 458 (W.VA. 1987). The Ohio Supreme Court in Hughes held that the alloca-
tion of the dependency exemption(s) was part of the marital property division. See, infra note 62.
44Id. at 457.
45Id.
[Vol. 5AKRON TAX JOURNAL
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CUSTODIAL PARENT DEPENDENCY EXEMPTION
state courts from allocating the exemption it would have said so.6 Thus, the court
held that state court has the equitable power to order the custodial parent to sign
the waiver.t 7
What this means for the custodial parent is that he/she is given a bargaining
chip which may be very valuable in voluntary settlements.48 Moreover, the court
noted that execution of the waiver is dependent upon a noncustodial parent's having
paid his court-ordered child support!19 In the event of non-payment, the custodial
parent may lawfully refuse to execute the waiver0
HUGHES V. HUGHES
In Hughes v. Hughes, the plaintiff-wife filed for divorce against the defendant-
husband in August of 1985. 11 The couple orally settled most issues prior to the
trial5 2 During these pre-trial negotiations, Mr. Hughes offered to pay $45 per child
per week to support the couple's five children in exchange for the four dependency
exemptions.53 Mrs. Hughes, however, refused to release her claim to the exemp-
tions?.4 Subsequently, the court resolved the issue and awarded all four exemp-
tions to Mr. Hughes, the noncustodial parent 5 The judgment entry stated that
it ".. . shall operate and have the full force and effect of the law, of rendering the
Plaintiffs consent to the Defendant's taking such minor children as dependent
deductions on [his yearly Federal, State and local income tax] returns."5 6
The Ohio Supreme Court weighed several factors before reaching its deci-
sion in Hughes. First, the court examined Section 152(e) and the legislative reason-
ing behind the amendments to that secion ?7 The court also looked to its decision
in Cherry v. Cherry8 which held that a domestic relations court has broad discre-
tion to determine the proper allocation of marital assets and property rights in
46Id. at 458.
4 7
Id.
48id. at 459. The value of this bargaining chip depends upon the amount of income; the higher the income
the more valuable exemptions become due to the progrenivity of the federal income tax. Id.
49Id. at 460.
50 Id.
51 Hughes v. Hughes, 35 Ohio St. 3d 165 (1988).
12 Id. The plaintiff sought custody of the couple's five minor children, a division of marital property, alimony,
child support, attorney fees and court costs. The only issues the couple could not settle prior to trial were
child support, the dependency exemptions and the disposition of a utility bill.
11 Id. One child was near emancipation.
54Id.
55M.
16 d. The Lucas County Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court holding that nothing in the Internal Revenue
Code prohibits a state court from awarding tax exemptions to the noncustodial parent as part of the marital
property division. Id. The Lorain County Court of Appeals was presented with the same issue and held that
the noncustodial parent could not lawfully claim the exemption as federal law did not allow such a result.
Leuenberger v. Leuenberger, C.A. No. 4415, slip op. at 7 (9th Dist. Ohio, April 15, 1987).
57d. at 166-67. See, supra notes 11-21.
SaId. at 167, citing 66 Ohio St. 2d 348, 421 N.E.2d 1293 (1981).
1988]
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a divorce proceeding. The court noted that nowhere in the legislative history of
the 1984 Tax Reform Act is an intent to curb this discretion expressed.5 9 Moreover,
the court was influenced by the fact that the Treasury Department has acknowl-
edged the power of a domestic relations court to award dependency exemptions
through its decrees. 60 Their rationale being that most disputes can be readily
resolved simply by looking at the divorce decree or separation agreement. 6 '
Based upon the foregoing, the Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that Section
152 did not preclude the action of the lower court in awarding the exemptions to
the noncustodial parent as part of the maritalproperty division.62 (Emphasis add-
ed.) However, the majority limited its holding by stating that the courts do not
have the power to force the custodial parent to release his/her claim to the exemp-
tion(s) 63 Nor may the noncustodial parent simply attach a copy of the divorce
decree or separation agreement to his/her tax return in lieu of the required writ-
ten declaration.64 Nevertheless, the noncustodial parent would have a contempt
of court action against the custodial parent if he/she decided to ignore the court's
order.6 5
At the heart of the dissent is the thought that the term "release" as used in
Section 152(e)(2), means "a custodial parent is entitled to an exemption for a child
in all cases, unless he or she voluntarily relinquishes or gives up that exemption." 66
(Emphasis added.) A court ordered release is not a voluntary act. Hence, a do-
mestic relations court is without jurisdiction to order a custodial parent to release
his/her dependency exemption(s) in a divorce proceeding. 7 According to Justice
Wright, any other reading of the federal tax code ignores its express language.68
CONCLUSION
The states which have been presented with the issue are clearly split as to
whether a state domestic relations court has the power to assign the dependency
exemption(s) to the noncustodial parent absent a waiver. Of these states, two camps
are readily emerging; those who read between the lines and those who read the
lines. In the first camp, the courts are finding they have an equitable power to order
the custodial parent to release his/her statutory right to the dependency exemp-
59 Id. at 167.
6 0Id. quoting Treasury Statement on H.R. 3475, Ronald Pearlman, Dep. Asst. Secy., Tax Policy, Before the
House Ways and Means Comm. (July 25, 1982). Id. at n.2.
61 Id
.
62 /d. at 168.
63 1d. at 167.
64Id. at 167-68.
6Id. at 168.
6Id. at 169.
67 Id.
68 d. at 169-70. See, supra note 36.
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CUSTODIAL PARENT DEPENDENCY EXEMPTION
tion(s). These courts are essentially relying on the fact that the Internal Revenue
Code does not expressly forbid such action. The latter camp, however, believes
the noncustodial parent may claim the exemption(s) only if the custodial parent
freely waives his/her right to it, or one of the other exceptions applies.
Ohio has found itself in the first camp as a result of the Hughes decision.
Whether the Ohio courts will boldly venture into the new frontier of section 152(e)
and then shy away, as Minnesota did, remains to be seen. One fact which should
be noted is that of the two Ohio appellate courts which ruled on the issue so far,
each decided it differently. Hence, troubled waters may lie ahead.
If the state courts continue along the paths they have initially chosen, defining
the parameters of section 152(e) will quickly become a ripe issue for the United
States Supreme Court. Perhaps, the best approach is the strict constructionist ap-
proach, whereby the custodial parent receives the exemption unless he/she chooses
to relinquish it. Given the general neglect of noncustodial parents to pay child sup-
port, it is the custodial parent who would benefit most from the exemption.
Furthermore, in many instances, the alleged incentive to pay created when
the custodial parent postpones executing the waiver is negligible. If a noncustodial
parent hesitates to make monthly support payments, the reluctance to make a lump
sum arrearge payment on or before April 15, for sake of the exemption, will be
even greater. Lastly, under the "implied power" approach, the Internal Revenue
Service will inevitably become entangled with future litigation when the Congres-
sional intent behind the amendments was to avoid such involvement all together.
One issue already surfacing is whether a noncustodial parent can attach a divorce
decree or separation agreement to his/her return in lieu of Form 8332.
AMANDA SPIES BORNHORST
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